The Role of the Union Lawyer by Schlossberg, Stephen I.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 47 | Number 3 Article 6
4-1-1969
The Role of the Union Lawyer
Stephen I. Schlossberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen I. Schlossberg, The Role of the Union Lawyer, 47 N.C. L. Rev. 649 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol47/iss3/6
THE ROLE OF THE UNION LAWYER
STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG*
INTRODUCTION
Labor unions in the United States got along for many years without
any full-time lawyers at all. Forty or fifty years ago most of the lawyers
who represented labor unions did so entirely out of conviction and with
the certain knowledge that, to earn enough money to live, they would
have to do other work. Now, however, there is a relatively small group
of lawyers whose entire practice consists of the representation of unions
and union members.
In 1944 Louis Waldman, General Counsel of the Longshoremen's
Union and counsel to other unions, wrote:
Twenty years ago, the field of labor law was not the established, re-
spected branch of the profession it is today. In those days the out-
standing labor attorney in New York was Morris Hillquit. Former
Congressman Meyer London, one of the most beloved figures in the
Socialist movement, was also known as a labor lawyer. Of course, there
were other reputable attorneys, then as now, who were willing to take
labor's money to defend it in some particular case. There were also
those who were ready to go legal slumming and tlose who would "do
something" for labor for political reasons. But few were willing to label
themselves as labor lawyers by embracing labor's cause. Then there were
the police court lawyers, the "fixers" who bled labor white and brought
into the movement nothing but cynicism and corruption, a legacy which
is still with us today.-
This was written only eight years after the passage of the Wagner
Act, long before Arthur J. Goldberg, former general counsel of the CIO
and the Steelworkers' Union, had been named, successively, Secretary of
Labor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and United States Am-
bassador to the United Nations. Indeed, times have changed and labor
lawyers enjoy new respectability. For instance, several prominent labor
lawyers have become teachers of law at major law schools.2 Nevertheless,
* General Counsel for the United Auto Workers.
'L. WALDMAN, LABOR LAwYER 144 (1944); see Segal, Labor Union Lawyers:
Professional Services to Organized Labor, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 343 (1952).
Bernard Dunan now teaches law at the University of Virginia; Theodore J.
St. Antoine is at the University of Michigan School of Law; and David Feller is
at the University of California at Berkeley; all three had been prominent union
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it can be said with some certainty that those neophyte lawyers whose per-
sonal and professional goals are status and great wealth had best find a
branch of the law other than union law.
Labor lawyers in the early days of the twentieth century seldom
achieved riches but a number had regional and even national reputations
as advocates. The most eminent may have been Clarence Darrow, although
he did not stay in the field and quite early in his career devoted himself to
the practice of criminal law in Chicago. There were others less well
known who served with great fidelity. There was John Murphy, who saw
the Western Federation of Miners through the Colorado labor wars.
Bill Cunea was a fighting Irishman and Socialist in Chicago, who, it had
been claimed, had been counted out as district attorney of Cook County
in 1910, or 1914, and his law partner William Rodriguez was a Socialist
alderman and a member of the Painter's Union. Carolyn Lowe was asso-
ciate counsel in the IWW espionage trials and served as counsel in many
of the criminal syndicalist cases in the Middle West. Phil Callery was the
attorney for the Kansas miners and other labor groups. Maxwell McNutt
defended labor cases in the courts of California. George Vanderveer, a
conservative Seattle lawyer, became the lawyer for the IWW in that
radical union's deepest trouble during and after World War I. le was
associate counsel in the Everett murder trial, and then was given the
gruelling job of defending 103 members of the IWW in the Chicago
espionage trial in 1918, one of the largest criminal trials in American
history. Subsequently, he, almost alone, was active in the criminal
syndicalist trials in the Northwest. Another advocate for the cause of the
IWW was a fine Yankee lawyer and humanitarian, George Roewer, who
defended the union during and after the Lawrence strike. Roewer handled
union cases when fees were few and far between if there were any at
all.
The late Robert F. Kennedy had some harsh-as well as kind-words
to say about this generation of union lawyers. Writing of his experiences
on the McClellan Committee, Senator Kennedy said:
No one could listen to the testimony before our Committee, or read the
record, and not be deeply concerned and badly disillusioned about the
practices some attorneys engaged in while representing labor and man-
lawyers in Washington. Two former UAW lawyers have entered teaching: Kurt
L. Hanslowe at Cornell Law School, and William Gould at Wayne State University
Law School.. Another former union lawyer, Louis H. Pollak, is presently Dean of
the Yale Law School.
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agement. From the first, we found lawyers who considered that their
clients were not the rank and file but the union officials who held the
purse strings.3
Then, later, he wrote:
However, labor has been fortunate enough to attract the active assis-
tance of many wise and skillful lawyers ... who have been drawn to the
growing labor movement by a sense of idealism and a dedication to the
cause of economic justice and a better way of life for the working man.
They are men of high principle, who recognize that their profession
carries with it certain responsibilities and obligations; they are com-
pletely loyal to the best interests of their clients-within the bounds
of sound professional ethics.4
There are 190 national and international unions headquartered in
the United States, with a membership of 19.1 million people.5 Some
independent law firms specialize in the representation of international
unions or both international and local unions. A single small firm or its
partners might serve as general counsel to several unions.' A few inde-
pendent attorneys act largely as "lawyers' lawyers" handling mainly
appellate and overflow work for regular union counsel.' Most interna-
tional unions, such as the UAW, have salaried general counsel and
operate departments of law within the unions. Local unions and regional
bodies are most often represented by individual lawyers, who are likely
to engage also in general practice and often operate extensively in the
areas of workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation.
Labor law, from the union side, is an exciting and intellectually and
socially rewarding specialty of the law in contemporary America. The
body of the law, essentially public in character, is constantly changing and
emerging and the problems presented are challenging, often poignant,
human problems. Labor law does not, in most instances, remunerate its
'R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 226 (1960).
'Id. at 228-29.
'U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1596, Di-
RECTORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
45 (1967).
'For example, the firm of Van Arkel and Kaiser in Washington, D.C., acts as
general counsel for the Musicians Union, the AFL-CIO Bakers Union, the Printers
Union, the State, County, and Municipal Workers Union, and others. The Mil-
waukee firm of Goldberg, Previant and Ullmen represents the Teamsters Union
and several other unions.
' Foremost among this group are Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Mozart G. Ratner,
Bernard Duanu, John Silard, Isaac Groner, and George Kaufmann-all of Wash,
ington.
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union practitioners-and perhaps not even its employer practitioners-so
handsomely as do such fields as corporation, tax and business law. More
often, however, the union lawyer identifies with his client in so high a
degree of ideology and philosophy that he would be unhappy in any other
field, no matter how well he was paid.'
THE CHARACihR OF THE UAW
Necessarily, because of the author's full time engagement as general
counsel and head of the UAW legal department, this article will deal
mostly with that kind of union lawyer employed by the UAW, a large
industrial union, unique in the labor movement. It is not possible to
discuss the lawyer's role in the UAW without some preliminary and
brief discussion of the UAW and its remarkable President, Walter P.
Reuther.'
The UAW has repeatedly acknowledged that its primary function is
to represent its members in collective bargaining,'0 but for the UAW,
that is only the beginning. The Union, now independent of the AFL-
CIO because of the failure of the Federation to respond to UAW calls
for reform, consistently strives to express its signal devotion to democracy,
internally and externally, its concern with the great issues of society and
its willingness to act and innovate. As Walter Reuther said in 1964:
[W]e have striven from the beginning to make our union a broad
social movement. We have sought to become not a narrow pressure
group, but an integral part of our society-a movement that knows it
' Some union lawyers have come from inside the labor movement. James Young-
dahl, a prominent union lawyer in the Southwest with offices in Little Rock, Ark.,
was an organizer for the Clothing Workers and is the Youngdahl of Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957), the famous preemption case. The writer was, for
some years, an organizer in the South for the ILGWU.
An example of the union lawyer's ideological and philosophical identification
with his client occurred in the fall of 1967, when the UAW went on strike against
the Ford Motor Company and was faced with the potential of a long, industry-wide
strike affecting most of the Union's members. All of the staff lawyers, like the
rest of the Union's full-time professionals and regular union staff, insisted on
taking a twenty-five percent cut in pay for the duration of the emergency, which
turned out to be twelve weeks. While this gesture hardly matched UAW President
Walter P. Reuther's refusal to accept any pay during the strike, it indicated the
depth of feeling of the legal professionals and their close identification with the
client's cause.
'For a more complete discussion of the UAW as an institution, see Reuther,
The United Autonobile Workers: Past, Present and Future, 50 VA. L. REv. 58
(1964), written with the assistance of Professor Daniel H. Pollitt of the University




can make progress only as the whole community progresses. If we can
but maintain our traditions, we have nothing to fear from the future.,-
Just as the UAW's primary task is collective bargaining, the pri-
mary legal obligation in the representation of the UAW is in the tradi-
tional field of labor law; but because of the UAW's broad social concern
UAW lawyers have opportunities and challenges unrelated to those of the
legal representative of a business-type trade union.
Before discussing some of the more challenging or esoteric aspects
of union practice, one should note that lawyers for large unions have to
do many of the same things done by those representing other large institu-
tions. House counsel for a labor organization becomes involved in fairly
standard housekeeping matters, many of a non-labor character. For in-
stance, unions have important legal problems in the areas of real property,
taxation and governmental reporting requirements. There are also legal
matters to do with pensions and insurance for staff and employees. Con-
sequently, union counsel spends considerable time drafting and approving
title documents and in approving, preparing and filing tax returns and
other governmental reports. While not particularly germane to labor law,
other elements of the representation of a large institution with more
than a thousand employees, millions of dollars of investments, and an
active involvement in the community are found in the work of the union
lawyer. There occasionally are suits with banks, tort matters such as
defamation, personal injury, and property damage, and a few quite
ordinary contract disputes. In the UAW, where phonograph records are
produced and books published, there are even occasional copyright matters.
ADVICE, COUNSEL AND BARGAINING
Perhaps the most important function of a union general counsel is
that of advice and counsel to the union's officers, its executive board and
its staff. This, of course, requires communication with the leaders of the
union and it also demands the assumption of a degree of responsibility
where the answers are not always clear and the safe and conservative
legal approach would be a simple "no." The union's lawyer must try
to find a way. In the UAW, current decisions, new laws and other legal
developments that have or could have an effect on the union are regularly
analyzed by the union's law department. Some matters are brought only
to the attention of the officers, others to the full International Executive
Board and some to the attention of the entire International staff. There
"Id. at 103.
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have been months in which as many as four lengthy memos analyzing
new legal developments, most often not directly involving the UAW,
have been written and distributed by the general counsel. In addition, the
legal department reports orally to the International Executive Board at
its regular meetings. The general counsel must supervise the work of
independent, ad hoc and regularly-retained counsel acting for the union
around the country and establish and maintain a consistent policy.
When a union has learned to use its lawyers, they are consulted regu-
larly by officers and top staff because preventive legal advice can often
prove most beneficial to the union; consequently, there are frequent day-
to-day consultations between UAW policy makers and lawyers. Contract
proposals are carefully checked, and government forms are either prepared
or approved by the union's lawyers. Precedent setting arbitration cases
are prepared with the assistance of lawyers and, in some instances, handled
by lawyers.
The lawyer's role in UAW negotiations, especially in the pattern-
setting bargaining at the automobile industry's "big three" and in the
difficult negotiations in aerospace, varies depending on the issues presented
by a particular set of negotiations, and, of course, the personality and
orientation of the particular lawyer. Normally, lawyers advise principal
union negotiators in private union caucus, write or check drafts of con-
tract proposals and language, and work out details with company counter-
parts after agreement on general principles. Sometimes lawyers join the
negotiating teams and present union proposals at the bargaining table.
Occasionally, a particular set of negotiations requires more lawyer
participation. The 1967 negotiations with Ford, Chrysler and General
Motors presented UAW lawyers with several interesting challenges.
Besides the more usual problems of contract negotiations such as wages
and hours, there were troublesome legal issues with respect to the protec-
tion of the bargaining unit from erosion by employer misclassification or
by accelerating technology, the protection of the work of the union's
members from subcontracting, and others. The most novel bargaining
issue, however, was the union's determination to establish wage parity
between Canada and the United States for comparable work for the same
employer.
The UAW had long felt, as a matter of morality, that Canadian
workers who performed the same jobs as workers in the United States for
the same employer should have equal pay for equal work. At General
Motors, for instance, Canadian workers were paid approximately 43
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cents per hour less than those in the United States. With the passage
of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 196512 and the execution of
the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965,'S a
common market in automobiles, trucks and components was, in effect,
created so that original equipment and completed vehicles could be manu-
factured in one country and sold in the other without any tariff payment
at all. For General Motors, Ford and Chrysler a single market had been
created in both countries, served by plants in either at the will of the
corporations. The UAW, because of its commitment to free trade, had
vigorously supported the Act and the Agreement.
The Union concluded that wage parity between the two countries had
become a matter of economic necessity for the members of the United
States bargaining units. It reasoned that if General Motors could make
a Chevrolet in Canada at a wage savings of 40 cents an hour or more for
sale in the United States, eventually most Chevys would be made there.
Consequently, the UAW made wage parity a high priority demand in its
separate negotiations with the three companies. General Motors and
Ford refused to bargain on the issue on grounds the Union was attempting
to bargain for employees outside the unit. So the issue was joined.
Counsel for the UAW filed unfair labor practice charges under sections
8(a) (1) "and (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act against
General Motors and Ford alleging that the employers had refused "to
bargain over and discuss a mandatory subject of collective bargaining-
the preservation of unit work." The union relied on decisions of the
courts and the NLRB in cases where clauses requiring employers to
limit production work to those other plants or employers maintaining com-
mensurate labor standards with those of the bargaining unit were at
issue."4 The issue of the legality of this particular union demand had
tremendous importance because it appeared likely that the refusal of the
employers to discuss this matter might result in a strike and, were one
of the issues on the table of questionable legality, the Union's position
would have been unduly endangered. Finally, however, while the cases
were still under investigation, the parties reached an accommodation, bar-
'12 19 U.S.C. § 2001 (Supp. I, 1965).
" Agreement Concerning Automobile Products With The Government of Can-
ada (January 16, 1965).
"E.g., Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) ; Orange Belt Dist.
Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Westinghouse Broadcasting
Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 1394 (1966); Highvay Drivers Local 107, 159 N.L.R.B. 84
(1966).
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gained over the issue of the disparity of wages in the United States and
Canada and the possible loss of work to the United States unit, and the
charges were withdrawn. UAW counsel, in a letter withdrawing the
charge against General Motors, wrote the NLRB: "There is no longer a
cloud over the bargaining table in the form of an employer claim that a
pending union proposal is illegal. . . . Now this matter . . . [is] on the
table for good faith collective bargaining. The contest is now a legiti-
mate one-shorn of technical, legalistic roadblocks."' 15 It is now, of course,
a matter of history that in 1967, the UAW and each of the "Big Three"
automobile companies agreed upon the achievement of total parity for
automobile workers in Canada and the United States.
A further legal complication in the 1967 automobile negotiations
occurred when certain of the employers indicated that they were consider-
ing the filing of an unfair labor practice charge against the UAW because
it changed its internal system of contract ratification to permit separate
ratification and, in so doing, gave the right of veto to skilled trades
workers in the units. After some discussion, however, none of the three
companies filed such a charge. In 1968, however, a federal court upheld
the legality of the UAW separate ratification procedure in a suit brought
by a smaller employer."
Finally, that set of negotiations had one further elusive legal issue.
UAW, in contrast to the Steelworkers Union, bargains individually with
the companies in the automobile industry. At the stage of the negotiations
when a strike appeared to be a distinct probability, the Wall Street Journal
did a story on the possibility of an employer mutual assistance combina-
tion 7 in the form of either a supportive lockout or financial assistance to
the struck company by the other two, which occasioned a flurry of legal
research. As far as we know nothing materialized along these lines,
possibly because Walter P. Reuther called a press conference and exposed
it fully.
INTERNAL UNION MATTERS
As President Reuther has written:
The UAW has not lost sight of the individual. Our contract pro-
posals come from the membership, are ratified by the membership, and
are administered by the membership. One of our prime objectives is a
1 Letter from Stephen I. Schlossberg to Jerome H. Brooks, Regional Director,
7th Region, NLRB, Aug. 25, 1967.
"8 Lear Siegler v. UAW, 287 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (appeal pending).
"' Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1967, at 2, col. 2.
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grievance process to protect the worker against petty tyranny at the
plant level. A.H. Raskin recently wrote that, although the UAW deals
for more than 300,000 employees in its negotiations with General
Motors, one official of the UAW stated that "we will fight, bleed and
die for a word that won't affect more than three people-perhaps not
even one in the whole life of the contract." Our concern for and control
by the individual member is what differentiates us from the corpora-
tions.18
Perhaps because of attitudes such as the above, UAW lawyers have had
little trouble in winning suits brought against it by individual members,
nor has there been any great difficulty from the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)?1
Sometimes its lawyers take positions unique in the labor movement, as
in the area of fair representation. The National Labor Relations Board
has held that Congress has imposed upon unions the duty of fairly repre-
senting all employees in the bargaining unit. In Miranda Fuel Co.,2 0 the
UAW was the only union to file an amicus curiae brief urging the NLRB
to take the position that "in the area of racial discrimination, rights
and prohibitions inhere in section 8 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, which the Board may, in appropriate cases, vindicate through unfair
labor practice proceedings."'" The NLRB accepted the suggestion and
for the first time held that violation by a union of its duty of fair repre-
sentation because of racial discrimination is a violation of sectons 8 (b) (1)
and (2), where it results in a loss of seniority or other employee benefits.'
Moreover, the UAW-alone among major industrial unions-has,
since 1957, provided for a Public Review Board, an independent body
entirely separate and apart from the UAW, composed of outstanding
citizens. The Public Review Board (PRB) is a final appellate body whose
decisions are binding upon the International Union, the locals and the
members. It is composed of outstanding clergymen, academicians and a
judge. Chairman of the Board is Msgr. George G. Higgins. Serving
with him are Dr. Jean T. McKelvey, Dr. Henry Hitt Crane, Judge George
": Reuther, mtpra note 9, at 87.
73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20 140 N.L.R.B. 181, enforcemnent denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" Brief for UAW as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" The Miranda Fitel rule was subsequently applied in Rubber Workers Local
12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 837 (1967)
(union's failure to process grievances of Negroes because of racial discrimination,
resulting in loss of position and denial of equal use of plant facilities, held an unfair
labor practice).
1969]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
N. Leighton, Rabbi Jacob J. Weinstein, Dr. Robert W. Flemming and
Professor Harry W. Arthurs. In ten years of operation, the PRB has
handled 189 appeals and 456 informal complaints and inquiries. The cost
of maintaining this private "supreme court" has averaged a little more
than three cents per member a year.23
From the beginning, the Board was composed of persons of the
highest caliber. Its original members included three outstanding clergy-
men (Rabbi Morris Adler, Msgr. George C. Higgins and Methodist
Episcopal Bishop B. Bromley Oxnam); a Negro judge (Wade H. Mc-
Cree, Jr.); a Canadian magistrate (J. Arthur Hanrahan) ; a university
chancellor (Clark Kerr) ; and a professor (Edwin E. Wittee). It has been
written that:
The UAW Public Review Board, established by the 1957 consti-
tutional convention of the Union, represents the broadest grant of
authority over its internal affairs ever voluntarily given by a labor
organization-or any other organization for that matter-to an outside
body.Y
The foregoing discussion of the Public Review Board is not meant
to convey the impression that lawyers are intimately concerned with it.
While UAW lawyers appear before the Board, the PRB has an entirely
separate relevance here. First of all, the establishment and operation of
the Board tells something in general about the UAW. Second, and of
great relevance to lawyers, the existence of the Board and its record make
the job of defending the Union against suits by disgruntled members or
locals in court much easier than might otherwise be the case. The doc-
trine of exhaustion of internal remedies is a much more formidable shield
when the final step of the procedures involves review by a distinguished
independent body.
Even where the UAW has not been a party to an action, its internal
remedies, particularly those afforded by the PRB, have been lauded by
courts. In Parks v. IBEW,25 the court said:
Some unions, like the United Automobile Workers, have responded
to the pressure for fairness in internal trial proceedings by establishing,
essentially external to the union organization, independent review
boards having the final word... 2 6
" Solidarity, Sept. 1968, at 5 (monthly newspaper of the UAW).2 J. STIEBER, W. OBERER & M. HAmINGTOx, DEm0ciiRcY AND PUBLIc REVIEW
7 (1960).
"314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
"314 F.2d at 913. See Brooks, Impartial Public Review of Internal Union
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Civil liberties lawyers will find interesting an internal matter in which
the UAW lawyers were involved. In 1964, President Reuther said "[The]
fact that the majority [in the union] has a right to act in the political
arena does not give them the right to utilize the minority's funds for
ideological purposes offensive to them."2 7 In International Association
of Machinists v. Street"8 and Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks
v. Allen,-" the Supreme Court held that the union shop provisions of the
Railway Labor Act30 did not permit unions, over an employee's objection,
the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he
opposes, but that the dissenting employee must make his dissent known
because it could not be presumed, and that such claims were individual and
could not be brought in a class action. Allen encouraged unions to afford
an internal remedy on this issue.
Before these cases came down the UAW had in its constitution
a system of "contracting out" for dissenters. Every UAW member had
the privilege of diverting the portion of his dues that would otherwise
be used for political purposes to a nonpartisan citizenship organization.
An objecting member could make this election by individually notifying
the International Secretary-Treasurer by registered mail; the election
was good for one year from the date of the request and could be con-
tinued from year to year by giving similar notification.
The officers of the Union, however, were not satisfied that the consti-
tutional provision fully met both the individual conscience needs of the
total membership or the suggestions of the Supreme Court; in late 1967,
they began consulting with the legal department on language for the im-
provement of Section 6 of Article 16 which might be proposed to the Con-
stitution Committee for submission to the 1968 UAW Convention. UAW
lawyers worked on this matter first with the officers of the Union and
then with the Constitution Commitee of the 21st UAW Constitutional
Convention held at Atlantic City, May 4-10, 1968. The Constitution
Committee agreed unanimously with the leadership proposal, and recom-
mended the amendment drafted by the legal department. The amendment
raised the privilege of diverting one's dues to a nonpartisan organization
to a right of refund. Provision was made for determination by a corn-
Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22 OHiO ST. L.J. 64 (1961);
Developments in, the Law-Associations, 76 HIv. L. REv. 983, 1035 (1963).
'7 Reuther, supra note 9, at 82.
8367 U.S. 740 (1961).
'o373 U.S. 113 (1963).
fU45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
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mittee of the International Executive Board of the proportion of dues
spent for political purposes, with a right of appeal from their determina-
tion to the full Executive Board and finally to the Public Review Board or
the UAW Convention.
The amendment was passed unanimously and the UAW became the
first union in America to respond fully to the civil liberties-oriented invita-
tion of the Court. UAW lawyers are understandably proud to have had
a part in this matter.
LABOR LAW ACTIVITIES
Organizing
The UAW is one of the most aggressive unions in the country when
it comes to organizing the unorganized. In 1967, for example, the
Union participated in 413 National Labor Relations Board representation
elections. It won 273 of these elections, thereby organizing 36,843
workers. UAW lawyers play a key role in organizing. They teach and
lecture to organizers on a regular basis. From the preparation of a
representation petition or the letter demand for recognition, all through
the organizing campaign, lawyers advise organizers how to conduct their
campaigns within the law and how to combat employer conduct that
violates the Labor-Management Relations Act or interferes with the
conduct of NLRB elections.
Frequently unfair labor practice charges are filed against employers
as a result of their conduct in these elections; this generates a substantial
volume of litigation, which is handled by UAW lawyers, before the
NLRB and, to a lesser extent, the courts of appeals. But the legal prob-
lems that arise in union organizing campaigns can run the gamut of labor
law. Here are often found problems of general law such as trespass, free
speech and freedom of association. More frequently, there are alleged
violations of all of the section 8(a) and some of the section 8(b) proscrip-
tions of the Taft-Hartley Act. PreEmption and representation problems
are also found in this area. The complicated body of law dealing entirely
with representation problems, a subject too often neglected in law school
labor law courses, particularly demands the constant attention of lawyers.
The legal problems encountered in organizing campaigns are not static;
as Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
The history of the rules governing contests between employer and em-
ployed in the several English-speaking countries illustrates both the
[Vol. 47
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susceptibility of such rules to change and the variety of contemporary
opinion as to what rules will best serve the public interest.83
Because the legal problems of organizing are of a recurrent but con-
stantly changing nature,3 2 UAW lawyers work closely with organizers
in general continuing education programs, in addition to working with
them on specific litigation. A monthly mailing to each organizer written
by UAW lawyers keeps him abreast of current legal developments, and
lectures and teaching sessions are held from time to time. A handbook
for organizers written by the author of this article was originally de-
veloped exclusively for UAW organizers but has since been published for
general distribution.'3
Other Litigation
The practice of law for a large industrial union, such as the UAW,
includes advocacy before a variety of administrative agencies and the
courts. The National Labor Relations Board is, of course, the primary
forum. UAW lawyers also handle cases before the state unemployment
compensation commissions, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, state civil rights commissions, the Missile Sites Labor Commis-
sion, and others. In most of these matters, the UAW is the charging
party, the petitioner or plaintiff. There are also arbitration matters and
suits for contract enforcement in the federal and state courts, as well
as the occasional injunction case.
Most of the UAW's cases before the NLRB have been routine in the
sense that they involve the problems usually concommitant to normal union
activities, such as attacks on employer conduct thought to be unfair and
the on-going defense of the union. In several kinds of cases, however,
the UAW has attempted to "pioneer"-that is, to help develop the
emerging law which in the opinion of UAW lawyers had lagged behind
the necessities and realities of the times."
"Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
" See, e.g., Bernel Foam Prod. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964); :Louis Aiello,
110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954); M. H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951).
S. SCHLOSSBERG, ORGANIZIkG AND THE LAW (1967).
"Pioneering" in a given field of labor law is, of course, not unique to the
UAW. The Steelworkers, for example, established much of the law of arbitration.
See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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The Access to Information Cases
A few years ago, we decided to pursue vigorously cases involving
employer refusal to supply necessary information for collective bargaining
and contract administration. This was a calculated decision premised on
the theory that collective bargaining should be made as informed and
rational as possible. The UAW sought out fact situations in which it
seemed possible to persuade the Board to elaborate better the duty to
disclose information pertinent in collective bargaining or in contract
administration. This duty, fundamental to the true implementation of
the congressional intention to promote collective bargaining, was long
ignored by the Board. However, recently under the prodding of UAW
and others, the Board has shown a firm intention to implement con-
gressional policy more fully by assuring unions that they will not be
made to bargain in ignorance of pertinent facts arbitrarily withheld by
the employer.
The UAW's "campaign" to make bargaining and contract administra-
tion more intelligent and rational is illustrated by a series of cases cul-
minating in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co." In Curtiss-Wright v.
NLRB, 86 the UAW sought information as to job evaluation factors and
wage rates for certain employees alleged by the Union to belong in the
bargaining unit, but claimed by the employer to be excluded from the
unit. The Board held, with court approval, that the employer, in a case
where the union contends there has been erosion of a unit, must divulge
information required to enable the union to determine whether the em-
ployees were properly excluded from the unit.
In Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB,3 7 the UAW was successful in ex-
panding the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's view of union rights in
a phase of contract administration." In that case, the Board, again with
court approval, held that an independent union time study may be made
in an employer's plant where necessary for the union to function intelli-
gently in behalf of employees asserting grievances concerning pay ratings
of particular jobs. It was not enough that the arbitrator would be per-
mitted an on-site de novo time study because, by permitting the union
to enter on the premises to conduct its own study, the union might, on the
basis of its more complete information, decide to settle the case. In other
" 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
" 145 N.L.R.B. 152, enforced, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
" 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, enforced, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966)." Cf. NLRB v. Otis Elev. Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
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words, in Fafnir, the Union needed the information to decide whether
or not to take the case to arbitration and an employer's naked property
right claim was held insufficient to bar union entry onto the employer's
property.
Finally there was the unanimous Supreme Court decision in favor
of the UAW (and the NLRB) in the Acme Industrial Case, 9 where the
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and enforced an
NLRB decision ordering an employer to give certain information and
rejecting the employer's contention that the availability to the UAW of a
grievance procedure eliminated a separate right to information.
The controversy in Acme arose when the UAW discovered the move-
ment of certain machinery from the employer's plant. When Union repre-
sentatives asked about the movement, the employer told them that he had
not violated the agreement and was not obliged to answer the questions.
Eleven grievances were filed and the Union wrote the employer requesting
the following information:
1. The approximate dates when each piece of equipment was moved
out of the plant.
2. The place to which each piece of equipment was moved and
whether such place was a facility operated or controlled by the com-
pany.
3. The number of machines or pieces of equipment that were
moved out of the plant.
4. What was the reason or purpose for moving the equipment out
of the plant.
5. Was this equipment used for production elsewhere.
The company refused to furnish the information and the Union filed
charges alleging a failure to bargain in good faith. The NLRB found
that the information was necessary "to evaluate intelligently the grievances
filed" and ordered the employer to supply it. The court of appeals, how-
ever, refused to enforce the Board's order on grounds that a clause in the
agreement calling for binding arbitration ousted the Board of jurisdic-
tion. The Supreme Court reversed, for otherwise
the union [would be forced] to take a grievance all the way through
to arbitration without ... the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the
claim. The expense of arbitration might be placed upon the union only
" NLRB v. Acme Indust. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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for it to learn that the machines had been relegated to the junk heap.
Nothing in federal labor law requires such a result.
40
The effect of Acme and the other cases has been to make collective
bargaining a rational process instead of "a game of blind man's bluff." 41
Remedy
The litigation against the Kohler Company of Wisconsin is deserving
of comment. There, lengthy litigation42 resulted in a settlement of the
contempt and back pay proceedings against the company for four and a
half million dollars. Almost as important to the UAW was that Kohler
finally reinstated the local leadership. The key decision in this protracted
series of NLRB and court battles was that of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in which the court, relying on NLRB v. Thayer,
4
3
balanced the strikers' alleged misconduct against that of the employer. 44
Kohler stimulated another policy decision. UAW lawyers reasoned
that while the more than ten-year string of litigation had finally benefited
the workers to the tune of four and a half million dollars, it might still
have been more profitable for Kohler, even with tremendous litigation
expenses added to the back pay bill, to fight rather than bargain. More-
over, as had other unions, we had witnessed the spectacle of employers
"playing out the legal string" so that in initial bargaining cases, they were
often able, by resisting bargaining through lengthy NLRB and court
litigation, to reap a profit by saving union-bargained wages and benefits
for years. We determined to seek a monetary remedy for employees whose
employer refused to recognize the union and bargain about the working
conditions of newly-organized workers. So the UAW has also attempted
to pioneer in the area of remedy. In a case now before the NLRB,4" the
UAW has sought a compensatory remedy for employer refusal-to-bargain
for newly-organized units.
Unions have long been troubled by the gap in the enforcement of
the National Labor Relations Act occasioned by the consistent failure of
the NLRB to provide an effective remedy in initial refusal-to-bargain
cases. As John Silard and I wrote in the Wayne Law Review:
"Old. at 438-39.
"lId. at 438 n.8, quoting Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 721 (2d
Cir. 1966).
42 See W. UPHoFr, KOHLER oN STRIKE (1966).
"213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954).
"'Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
911 (1962).
" Ex-Cell-O Corp., No. 25 CA 2377 (NLRB, filed Mar. 2, 1967).
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Since the Wagner Act, and continuing under the Taft-Hartley Act,
it has been an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bar-
gain collectively" with -the union representing workers he employs. The
only catch is that the NLRB has permitted employers who refuse to
obey that section of the law to profit at the expense of the wronged
workers. The longer the employer breaks the law the more he profits,
in -the absence of Board-enforced make-whole remedies.
This failure in remedy seems to negate the fact that collection bar-
gaining is the declared policy of the United States. Those few cases
where procedures are followed to the very end result largely in mean-
ingless orders. This is so because delay means economic gain for the
respondent and ultimate weakening of the employees and their chosen
representative.
Most of the cases seem to follow a definite pattern. If a union files
for recognition or for an election, the employer's first move is to stall.
Even where there are no real issues, these employers insist on a hearing
at the NLRB. Before, during and after the hearing they seek post-
ponements-delays in attendance and in filing briefs. Axiomatic propo-
sitions are contested. Then, after the NLRB orders an election, there
is an attempt to create issues for possible review -by the Board in
Washington. This is accomplished by filing objections after the Union
has won the election. When the local NLRB office overrules the objec-
tions they are appealed to Washington. Upon final certification of the
union by the Board, there is usually a refusal-to-bargain, thus forcing
the union to file a charge of a section 8(a) (5) violation. So the process
goes ultimately through the NLRB and a federal court of appeals. If
the employer does not seek Supreme Court review or run the risk of
a contempt citation, this is the end of the line.
Even assuming these employers act in good faith and are merely
"technical" violators of law, the result is the same when they have lost-
economic gain for them and corresponding loss for the employees. The
standard remedy has been for the court to enforce the NLRB order of
posting a notice and bargaining in good faith. Meanwhile all of this
has consumed from one to four years. In the end, we have a result that
should have been reached years before. At this point in time the union
is, of course, in a much weaker position than it was when the violation
occurred, and the employees have lost the valuable opportunity to negoti-
ate economic gains and other benefits. 46
Intervention in Appeals from the NLRB
We determined also to try to eliminate a frustrating matter of pro-
cedure. Where a union, an employer, or an individual charged another
"Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-to-
Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE. L. REv. 1059, 1059-60 (1968). Those who cherish the
institution of collective bargaining remain hopeful that the Board will soon act
favorably in the Ex-Cell-O case.
199
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with unfair labor practice, participated fully in all proceedings before
the NLRB, and won, it nevertheless was not entitled to intervene in
enforcement litigation. According to the Board, once a party was fully
successful before it, the protection of that victory in the courts was
entirely a matter for the Board. This, of course, included decisions
whether to seek or oppose certiorari. Similarly a charged party who
was vindicated before the NLRB was said to have no right to intervene
in the review litigation. We were fortunate enough to have a case in
each of two circuits in which we had been a winner as both a charging
party and a respondent.
On December 7, 1965, the Supreme Court handed down unanimous
decisions in Local 283, UAW v. Scofield and Local 133, UAW v. Fafnir
Bearing Co.17 in an opinion constituting a complete victory for the UAW.
The Court held, in agreement with the UAW, "that both the successful
charged party (in Scofield) and the successful charging party (in Fafnir)
have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals proceeding which
reviews or enforces Labor Board orders."
'48
In Scofield, a number of members had charged the Union with a
violation of Taft-Hartley because they were fined for exceeding local
union production ceilings. The NLRB found that the Union had not
violated the Act and the employees sought review in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. The UAW sought to intervene, and when the court
of appeals refused to permit the Union to come in as a party we petitioned
the Supreme Court. In Fafnir, the Union charged the company with
refusal to bargain and the Board found the employer guilty. The
employer sought review of the Board decision in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and the UAW sought to intervene there to protect
its victory. Again, the court of appeals denied us intervention and this
case was joined with Scofield in the Supreme Court.
We believe these cases are of great importance to all parties who
practice before the Labor Board. Experience has shown that even though
we have great respect for NLRB lawyers, we cannot rely entirely upon
them to protect our interests. Most important, where we are a party in
the court of appeals, we have an independent right to seek Supreme Court
review and, of course, the right to oppose such review sought by an em-
ployer or the Board in appropriate cases. These decisions give unions
and employers the right to argue orally in the courts and to point out
'"382 U.S. 205 (1965).481d. at 208.
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pertinent parts of the record below. The result will be a new standard
of fairness in the administration of the Labor Act in the courts. But, at
the same time, prudence is in order. The UAW has taken a very strong
policy position to ascertain that the newly-won right of intervention in
cases in which enforcement or review of NLRB order is sought is not
abused. Obviously, it would be a serious mistake if lawyers for local
unions or, for that matter, for international unions decided to intervene
in every NLRB review of enforcement case. The currency would be
cheapened. Neither should lawyers flood the Supreme Court with peti-
tions. Cases in which Supreme Court review is sought must be screened
carefully so that parochial, inconsequential cases will not snow under the
Court and only important questions will be presented to it.
Now, however, because of Scofield and Fafnir, a party victorious
before the Labor Board can be heard in protection of the victory. Experi-
ence has taught us the importance of this right.
Plant Relocations and Contracting Out
When an employer moves his plant to a new location, or contracts out
substantial amounts of bargaining unit work to another employer, the
move, as planned, almost invariably results in his employees losing their
jobs. Because of the severe impact such employer conduct has on the
lives of its members, the UAW, in the courts and before the Labor Board,
has tried to require the employers involved to make adequate provision
for his employees. In UAW v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co.,4" for example,
we secured a preliminary injunction in a federal district court to require
the employer, who was moving his plant to Georgia and had offered
transfers to his employees, to continue to apply the labor contract at the
new location."0 The contracting out of bargaining unit jobs was involved
in UAW v. NLRB. 1 A court of appeals held that General Motors
violated its duty to bargain by unilaterally contracting out six bargaining
unit jobs, and reversed the NLRB, which had held that the company's
action was permitted by the contract and that the loss of only six jobs
from a large assembly plant was not a significant detriment to the unit
4 46 L.R.R.M. 2975 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
" Other cases involving plant relocations in which the UAW was a party in-
clude: UAW v. Seagrave Div., F.W.D. Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2874 (E.D. Ohio
1964); UAW v. Avis Indus. Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2632 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Oddie
v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961), rezvd, 305 F.2d
143 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).' 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967).
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or the employees. 2 The law in both these areas is still unsettled; accord-
ingly the Union anticipates that more litigation will be required to secure
the safeguards that its members must have.
"EXTRACURRICULAR" ACTIVITIES
Union lawyers are often fortunate in that their institutional clients' in-
terests extend far beyond traditional trade union or labor law matters,
so that they become involved in areas such as civil liberties, civil rights,
and the broad spectrum of legal matters that can have some effect on the
quality and kind of society and community in which we live. UAW
lawyers have perhaps more such opportunities than most lawyers for inter-
national unions.
For instance, UAW is presently participating as amicus curiae on
the side of the Detroit School Board in a suit against the state of Michigan
alleging a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and of the state constitution in the allocation of state aid to school
districts.5 3 The UAW's reasoning is that aid to students should be supplied
on the basis of how much it takes to provide a decent education in par-
ticular situations rather than the value of the houses and establishments
in a particular community-that is, on the amount of the tax base in a
school district. The school board alleges that the principle of equal pro-
tection is violated when there is a much larger per pupil expenditure in
tax-rich suburbs than in inner-city slum schools. The case, while still in
the early stages at this writing, has already attracted considerable atten-
tion54 and seems to be a potential candidate for Supreme Court review.
Another pending suit in which UAW was filed a brief as amicus
curiae is Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administra-
tion. 5 The suit was filed by Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer
Reports, and seeks to force the Veterans Administration to release test
information that the VA has on commercial hearing aids. The consumer
organization filed the suit in July 1968, seeking to require the federal
government to release the information under the Freedom of Information
z2See Weltronic Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1968).
Board of Educ. v. State, Civil No. 103342 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., filed
Feb. 2, 1968).
"E.g., Wall Street Journal, July 16, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
' Civil No. 68-2875 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 19, 1968). A similar case, Mclnnis v.
Shapiro, No. 68C. 673 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1968), was dismissed by a three-judge
panel. At the present, a direct appeal is pending in the Supreme Court, No. 1033,
Oct. term, 1968, and the UAW filed an amicus brief on March 10, 1969.
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Act."6 The tests were conducted for VA by the National Bureau of
Standards. If successful, the suit might set a precedent which could force
the government to release information on thousands of items it tests and
evaluates regularly. The Act, which went into effect in July, 1967, pro-
vides for judicial review of a federal agency's refusal of access to, or with-
holding of, information. Consumers Union had exhausted the admin-
istrative channels outlined in the Act when the VA, on June 26, 1968,
refused its final appeal.
Of course, UAW has no direct interest in this action, but President
Reuther said: "We are taking this action because of this Federal agency's
refusal to divulge to the consuming public information the public is
entitled to have and which is vitally important to it. If consumers are to
spend their hard-earned money intelligently, they must be able to know
what products are a 'good buy.' 57
The UAW's intense commitment to the principle of equal justice and
the cause of civil rights has led its lawyers into many cases attacking race
prejudice. Three cases serve as examples.
In Chapnan v. Watson,5" the Union, through two outstanding
Chicago attorneys who regularly represent the UAW, Harold Katz and
Irving Friedman, participated in support of the position of the Illinois
State Director of the Department of Registration and Education, who had
been enjoined by a lower court from enforcing a rule against the accep-
tance of discriminatory listings by real estate brokers. The Supreme Court
of Illinois, focusing on the interest of the plaintiffs in perpetuating racial
discrimination, reversed and ordered the injunction dissolved.5 9
Another Chicago amicus curiae appearance involved the UAW in
supporting the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, and was
less successful. In Motorola, Inc. v. FEPC,60 the state supreme court
reversed a lower court affirmance of findings by the FEPC that the em-
ployer had committed an unfair employment practice in falsely recording
'5 U.S.C. § 301 (1966).
: UAW, Press Release, July 20, 1968.
40 Ill. 2d 408, 240 N.E.2d 604 (1968).
°[O]ur attention in this case must focus on the conduct of the plaintiffs, the
nature of the interest they seek to protect and its relation to public policy,
rather than on the extent of that interest or on the legality of the defendant's
conduct. Because the contracts upon which the plaintiff's actions are based
are contrary to public policy the circuit court should have dismissed the
complaints in the consolidated case.
Id. at 415, 240 N.E.2d at 609.
0 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
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a test grade of a Negro applicant for a job to avoid hiring him. However,
despite the employer's claim that the act setting up the FEPC was un-
constitutional, a proposition vigorously resisted by UAW, the court found
the act and the procedures under it constitutional. Its reversal of the lower
court was based only on its view that the commission had failed to
establish discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
UAW lawyers joined with the NAACP in NAACP v. City of Detroit"1
in an action seeking a judgment declaring a "home owners" ordinance
unconstitutional."2 The issue was whether the ordinance was so vague
as to be unconstitutional. The problem for the drafters of the ordinance
had always been that if they were specific enough to convey the real pur-
pose of the statute they would reveal that the City of Detroit was acting
to preserve segregation, so the plaintiffs and amici properly pointed out
the fatal vagueness of the ordinance, and the court held the ordinance un-
constitutional.
Quite apart from the participation in such cases as those described
above, there are other opportunities to work on matters of general public
interest. For instance, another interesting matter, completely unrelated
to labor law, arose in 1967 and 1968. President Reuther served as a
member of the American Bar Association Commission on the Reform
of the Electoral College. His work on that distinguished commission in-
volved questions of constitutional law and national policy and, as might
be expected, occasioned consultation with his lawyers. The commission
" No. 38272 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Dec. 27, 1966).
" Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 898F, Sept. 16, 1964:
Sec. 1. Each Detroit resident and residential property owner shall enjoy the
following rights, and it is the public policy of the City of Detroit to recognize,
respect and protect such rights:
(a) The right of privacy, the right to choose his own friends and associ-
ates and to own, occupy and enjoy his property in any lawful fashion
according to his own dictates;
(b) The right to freedom from interference with his property by public
authorities attempting to give special privileges to any group;
(c) The right to maintain what in his opinion are congenial surroundings
for himself, his family and his tenants;
(d) The right to freedom of choice of persons with whom he will negoti-
ate or contract with reference to such property, and to accept or reject any
prospective buyer or tenant for his own reasons;
(e) The right to employ real estate brokers or representatives of his
choice and to authorize and require them to act in accordance with his in-
structions.
Sec. 2. Any person willfully interfering with or denying such rights of any
Detroit resident or residential property owner shall be punished by fine not
to exceed $500.00 or by imprisonment not to exceed ninety days.
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recommended the abolition of the electoral college and the election of the
President and Vice President of the United States by direct popular vote.
Senator Bayh introduced a resolution to accomplish these reforms6" and
hearings were held on the reform of the electoral system in the United
States. 4 At those hearings I, as general counsel of the UAW, testified
for reform of the presidential election process. During the course of that
testimony there developed a colloquy on strategy which illustrates a differ-
ence in approach between the senator and the labor lawyer:
Mr. Schlossberg. At this point, Mr. Chairman, if you would not
object, I would like to comment on the question you put to Senator
Long. We understand the complexion test of the legislative process and
the need for flexibility in presenting a resolution of such great impor-
tance, which involves the amendment of the Constitution. But we urge,
Mr. Chairman, that if, in those few rare cases, it becomes necessary
to have a runoff, the principle which motivates the entire thrust of
this bill is still applicable and still valid and that the people should still
elect the President.
In other words, we say, Mr. Chairman, that there should be no
give on this principle of direct election. If a runoff becomes necessary
in those very rare instances, we think a runoff should be conducted
even though it would be expensive and time consuming. Sometimes
the processes of democracy are more costly than other processes, but we
believe that price is a price well worth paying.
Senator Bayh. If I may interrupt, since you did depart from your
text here momentarily-
Mr. Schlossberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Certainly, you are familiar with the bargaining
process.
Mr. Schlossberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. I have found that the experience I have had in the
Senate, having dealt personally with one constitutional amendment, is
that it just is physically impossible to get intricate and major changes in
this vital document, our Constitution, without a significant amount of
bargaining. Now, given these two alternatives, and we may not get to
that point-I hope we do not-but given the opportunity on the one
hand, to elect our President by popular vote for the first time in history,
barring only the contingency in which one candidate gets less than 40
percent, and you are well aware of the infrequency of this, the im-
probability of it-comparing that contingency with the fact of having no
change, what do you say is the better of those two alternatives? Ad-
mitting, as I say, that I hope we do not get ourselves into that position.
S.J. Res. 2, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
Hearings on S.J. Res. 2 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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But sometimes you get down to the place where the tunnel narrows;
then you have to look it squarely in the eye.
Mr. Schlossberg. Well, Mr. Chairman, my experience with the
bargaining process leads me to say that if you begin bargaining by
stating your fallback position, you have really, in the very essence,
adopted that fallback position. We have found in our experience in
another area of bargaining, in another area of negotiation quite different
from the Congress, I am sure, that any indication of an acceptable posi-
tion other than the position we espouse at the time with dedication and
sincerity, an indication of a fallback position is likely to become the
position that you are espousing.
Senator Bayh. I really do not think that that is exactly appropriate
to the responsibility of a congressional subcommittee, though. I under-
stand the delicate position labor and management are in in negotiations.
I think our position is pretty well admitted when we introduce a piece
of legislation bearing our name. But in trying to explore and pick the
minds, if I may use that phrase, of those of you who are really sig-
nificantly involved in this whole picture, I think we have a responsibility
to explore these alternatives. Because you, unfortunately, are not going
to be sitting in on this negotiation when it occurs.
Mr. Schlossberg. That is right. I understand that. I just want to
say this, that-
Senator Bayh. I am well aware that you do not expose your whole
[sic] card until the last moment.
Mr. Schlossberg. That is right. I feel, though, that even-first, I
feel as a matter of principle that the principle of congressional election
of the President under any circumstances, whether it was thrown from
the electoral college into the Congress or whether it was thrown as a
result of a non-40-percent candidate into the Congress, is a bad prin-
ciple and I am opposed to it. I am here to support direct election by
the people even in the event of a runoff.
Now, having said that, let me say that as a matter of tactics and
strategy, and you certainly are a better judge of that than I am in your
area, in your bailiwick, so to speak, I still would say that with the
tremendous support that has come for your resolution, for the philosophy
embodied in your resolution from the divergent groups in this society,
from the chamber of commerce and from the NAACP, is not opposed
to the direct election system, because I would assume that the Congress
would make sure that there would be no discrimination in the voting for
President and Vice President and that the courts will see, too, that
that is done, that that does not exist.
So I would say that when you have an opportunity to amend this
thing, it ought to be done clean and it seems to me that the principle,
as I say, of direct election is as valid on runoff election as it is in
the first instance and that with the powerful pressure of groups like
the American Bar Association, the NAACP, the UAW, the chamber
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of commerce, and other groups who have endorsed this in philosophy
and with the time being ripe, I think we ought to do it in a way that
is clean. It seems to me the principle is just as valid and I would urge
the Senator to stick to the direct election principle all through.65
Then anticipating the unanswered question of why a labor union
testified on a resolution unrelated to unions, the writer stated:
Our interest, Mr. Chairman, in electoral college reform is a logical
one that springs directly from the basic principle on which the UAW
was founded and on which it has always operated. That is the principle
of equality of individuals, equality of economic opportunity, equality of
educational opportunity, equality of social opportunity, and equality
and equity participation. It was to secure a greater measure of
equality and equity for the working people of this country that the
UAW came to its existence. The UAW has never subscribed to the
narrow philosophy that says that a labor union's only function is to
secure higher wages for its members. President Reuther believes that
a union's interests go far beyond the shop. Indeed, no one can accuse
the UAW of having taken a parochial point of view. We are inter-
ested in every important aspect of national life. While it is important
to secure a decent wage to make a worker a first-class citizen, the
UAW has, from its inception, recognized the importance of partici-
pation in the total society. There are many things that workers can-
not achieve for themselves at a bargaining table or on a picket line.
Some of those things, dealing with the quality of a society, can only be
achieved through the election of executive and legislative representatives
responsive to the needs and desires of their constituents, who can create
the legal framework of an equitable, just society. To this end the UAW
has, for many years, maintained an extensive group of programs to
educate its members to be intelligent, informed members of the electorate
and to insure that they exercise their right to vote.
As we see the question of method of election it involves the basic
principle of equality-of the right of every citizen of age to vote and
have his vote count exactly the same as that of every other voter. This
is, I take it, the theoretical basis of the recent one-man, one-vote de-
cisions that the courts have handed down. To us the logic and morality
of those decisions is inescapable. And if the principle is right and im-
portant in the election of State legislators, surely it is just as right, and
just as important in the election of the two Executives of our country
-- officials who represent the constituency of all Americans-all equal
participants, by constitutional mandate, in the political process. That
this constituency wants its collective voice heard more directly, by
abolishment of the electoral college and substitution of direct elec-
tion has been made manifestly clear by recent polls. And that the
a Id. at 677-86.
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officials whose election we are talking about favor such a change was
made clear in President Johnson's remarks on the subject last year. 0
Closer to home, but out of the run-of-the-mill matters of labor law,
are those instances in which the UAW has litigated and defended the
constitutional rights of its members and staff in civil liberties cases.
Three cases are particularly noteworthy. John T. Watkins, an UAW staff
employee, refused to tell the House Un-American Activities Committee
whether he knew some thirty persons to have been members of the Com-
munist Party. Although he had been a forthright witness with regard
to his own activities and the activities of those he believed to be still
active in the Communist apparatus, he was convicted of contempt of
Congress. The UAW assisted him in financing the costs of his defense,
and in Watkins v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court reversed his con-
viction on grounds that he had not been sufficiently informed as to the
pertinency of the unanswered questions to hold him in contempt. The
UAW, in Taylor v. McElroy," sought the reinstatement of a member dis-
charged from his job in a defense plant as a security risk. The case hinged
on the denial to Taylor of his right to confront his accuser, who was un-
known to him. Union lawyers argued that it was unconstitutional to label
one as a security risk on the word of an unknown accuser. The case was
argued in the Supreme Court but was mooted when the government
granted Taylor security clearance and reinstated him in his job. 9 Finally,
the UAW intervened to protect a member critical of the Union leadership
from deportation. Frederick John Williams was born in Wales and came
to the United States as an infant. Subsequently, he joined the Communist
Party but left it in 1947. Yet as late as 1966, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service sought to deport him. Although Williams had
been a bitter internal political opponent of the Union leadership, UAW
lawyers assisted him in contesting the deportation proceedings, and were
able to convince the Board of Immigation Appeals to grant Williams
permanent residence.
CONCLUSION
The secret in practicing law regularly for a union is to have the closest
"Id. at 680.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
08360 U.S. 709 (1959).
A companion case, however, held that the Secretary of Defense could not
deprive an employee of his job in a proceeding which did not afford the opportunity
of confrontation and cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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kind of identification and relationship with the client without becoming
the client. This is true with respect to both inside, or house, counsel and
outside, or retained, counsel. Those who understand this, serve their
clients best.
Martin Mayer reports in his book The Lawyers that Arthur J. Gold-
berg expressed amusement at the surprise of those impressed with his
efficiency in administering the affairs of the giant United States Labor
Department. Mayer quotes Goldberg as saying, "Phil Murray used to
get sick a lot, and I had a lot to do with running the CIO. I got relaxed
about administration."" Indeed, Arthur Goldberg "had a lot to do with
the running" of the Steelworkers Union as well as the CIO. But there is
only one Arthur J. Goldberg. Most of the best union lawyers today share
their clients' reluctance to have the lawyers very much involved "with the
running of the union." Ideally union lawyers like very much to be lawyers.
Most union lawyers are happy in their work. The body of law with
which they deal is dynamic and fluid. Their cases involve real live human
beings in poignant human situations. Their contacts with interesting
personalities in the leadership and ranks of labor are frequent and
stimulating. Moreover, in almost every instance there is a feeling of
identification with client goals that is rarely found in other kinds of
law practice. There are important psychological rewards in labor law
for those whose inclinations are toward goal advocacy rather than the
pure art of practice for its own sake.
Labor union lawyers, while rarely organized on a formal basis, find
many opportunities to fraternize with their colleagues and to share ex-
periences and theories that might improve the administration of the law
or promote greater equity as they see the need. Their relationships with
their counterparts who represent management are, for the most part,
cordial and often rewarding. One of the most compelling reasons for this
generally friendly relationship is that the parties are entwined in con-
tinuing relationships. A contract, an arbitration, and even a litigated
case is rarely in labor law the final chapter. There are very few "one-
shot" propositions. The parties must live together. The not infrequent
brushes union lawyers enjoy with academicians, arbitrators and dedicated
government labor lawyers are often a source of great pleasure to them."1
" M. MAYF, THE LAWYERS 383 (1966) (emphasis added). Mayer is himself
the son of a labor lawyer, Henry Mayer, who is one of the few labor advocates to
practice on both sides of the table.
" I, for instance, have found great stimulation from association with such
19691
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Just as other advocates, labor lawyers like to win cases. Their most
important satisfaction, however, usually derives from their unspoken
feeling that, win or lose, they are practicing public law in the public
interest.
academic greats as Professors Philip Taft, Charles 0. Gregory, and Philip Ross.
My association with William E. Simkin, former Director of the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service, was a most rewarding experience.
